

The Strategies of Government and Nongovernmental Actors in the Resettlement and Reintegration of IDPs in Eldoret, Kenya

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Abstract The Kenya government was between 2008 and 2015 completely stretched in terms of intentions and resources to resettle and reintegrate more than 650 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled their homes following violence arising from 2007 disputed elections. This study examines the strategies used by the government and nongovernmental actors in the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs in Eldoret. The study is informed by the Cernea (2000) Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction (IRLR) model which helps in the analysis and prediction of risk, impoverishment and reconstruction, in their relation to resettlement. It employs the ex post facto comparative research design to draw comparisons between 189 in camp and a further 189 out of camp respondents drawn from a population of 7,249 IDP households, regarding their views on the design and implementation of the resettlement and reintegration programs by the government and nongovernmental actors. Results indicate that the process suffered many gaps, like failure to profile the IDPs, poor distribution of resources and failure to consult the victims, which made IDPs doubt the commitment of the actors to resettle them. The study concludes that the process would have been conclusive if there was adequate coordination.

Keywords IDPs, Resettlement, Reintegration, Government Actors, Nongovernmental Actors, Kenya

Introduction

Kenya, like any other country in the world emerging from a post conflict situation, has since 2008 been challenged in terms of intentions and resources in her quest for the resettlement and the reintegration of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) arising from the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Following the violence that erupted

after the 2007 disputed election that witnessed over 1,300 people killed and 650 000 displaced from their homes (ODI, 2008; KNDRM, 2009) to various camps in Limuru, Molo, Eldoret, Kakamega and many other parts of the country, the problem of IDPs in Kenya received a lot of attention world over prompting many actors including the Kenyan government and nongovernmental organizations to embark on the process of resettling and reintegrating the affected population.

The process gained more credence after the signing of the peace agreement between the two principals in the disputed elections, witnessed by the former United Nations Secretary Kofi Anan, following which the government initiated ‘*Operation Rudi Nyumbani*’ (Operation Return Home) as the first step to resettle the IDPs. The initiative included provision of transport and financial support for returning IDPs. Although the program encountered several logistical and administrative hitches, its early results saw some 347,800 IDPs voluntarily return to their homesteads, prompting the government to close down most of the original IDP camps in Nakuru, Naivasha, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia (GOK, 2009). However, the government in most cases only bought land for the IDPs but did not address certain determinants like economic, social, cultural, governance, psychological and material demands that are necessary for a more successful reintegration process that can meet sustainable livelihood (UNOCHA Kenya, 2009).

The phenomenon of internal displacement is not new to Kenya, and did not start with the 2007/2008 post-election violence as it featured to some extent during the pre-colonial era (Oloo, 2011). The cause of 2007/2008 IDPs in Kenya can be traced back to the pre-colonial era when the British government forcefully took land from people, especially in the Mount Kenya region, making them landless (Brown, 2003; Oloo, 2011). After independence in 1963 the government helped resettle most of the displaced Kikuyus in the Rift Valley thereby giving reasons to the Kalenjins allied communities the desire to

recover their ancestral lands from the Kikuyus (Oloo, 2011). These grievances were rife prior to the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections, when many people were displaced, but the humanitarian crisis was vastly experienced during the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

But as the Kenyan government has learnt, responding to the needs of IDPs is one of the greatest humanitarian challenges a government can face (Hampton, 2002). HRW (1997) observes that many people displaced by the conflict that arose in the 1992 election in Uasin Gishu County remained in camps to the next held in 1997. Part of the reasons why most of those displaced during the 2007/2008 violence remained in camp for long was due to the failure of the government and NGOs to adequately profile the IDPs and disaggregate them into categories according to needs. The government as therefore confronted with a situation where some IDPs wanted to go back home and others not wanting to, even when it appeared that the conditions for a successful return were in place. Such, and many other obstacles have undermined the efforts of the government and other non-state actors in the resettlement of IDPs, and some displaced persons continue to live in camps in Uasin Gishu County and other parts of the country.

That notwithstanding, the issue of the challenges facing IDPs in camps, in Kenya and the region, is yet to be adequately studied. Studies in the public domain include those by Kamungi (2001) and Human Rights Focus Gulu (2008) which focus on the socio economic problems and the protection of IDPs; Klopp, Githinji and Karuoya (2010) that dwells on displacement and local peace building. Information on internal displacement is also available in reports by humanitarian organizations, newspapers and government policy documents. This paper summarizes the results of a research that builds on the above studies to address the social and economic determinants of resettlement of IDPs in Kenya. It provides a more scholarly approach in documenting the experiences of IDPs in the post conflict reconstruction stage in order to challenge the traditional solutions, in the hope of giving a local perspective to the phenomenon of displacement, that can be a springboard from which other researchers can conduct further research, and help developers to come up with more encompassing solutions informed by the changing nature of conflicts and IDP experiences.

Resettlement and Reintegration of IDPs in Focus

According to Piguët & Dechassa (2004) resettlement is a planned or spontaneous redistribution of population, a process that can either be voluntary or involuntary (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). Populations engage in involuntary resettlements when faced by bad climatic conditions, population pressure and exhaustion of natural resources,

rapid urbanization, infrastructure and farmland developments, and social conflicts (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). However, many resettlements around the world, notably in Nepal, Columbia and countries in the Middle East and Africa, have gone wrong due to inappropriate planning, hasty implementation, exclusion of host communities, and inappropriate selection of resettlers and sites and other multifaceted biophysical and socioeconomic constraints (Piguët & Dechassa, 2004).

Esser (2005) holds the view that organizations that carry out the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs are fond of using an idealized approach where political negotiations and logistical support feature prominently with the aim of persuading the target population to rejoin their old communities or others designated to absorb them, even when it is evident that individual IDPs usually prefer to relocate to urban places where they can readily get both economic and social opportunities (Esser (2005). He makes a candid observation that due to lack of opportunities in rural areas, most post conflict settlement patterns have been associated with acceleration of the growth of cities and provincial centres. It is also not unusual for many resettlers to drift back to urban areas due to chronic lack of shelter and basic services in areas of return, coupled with inadequate resettlement packages (Esser, 2005; Muhumiza, 2011).

But why do populations react that way when they are moved to a new place in a forced and planned manner? Cernea (2000) published the widely referenced 'Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction' (IRLR) model which helps in the analysis and prediction of the elements of risks, namely, risk, impoverishment and reconstruction, in relation to resettlement. The model informs us that population displacement may lead to at least eight forms of socioeconomic risks: unemployment, landlessness, social marginalization, homelessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, community disarticulation, and faster rate of morbidity. Further, it explains that risks vary according to the affected population and the circumstances in their site, in the sense that a risk may not be experienced by a group while another one is seriously affected by it. In situations where people are displaced, women and children suffer more severe impacts than other social groups; and, the host community is also exposed to impoverishment as massive inflows of displaced persons create pressure on local resources (Cernea, 2000).

However, Cernea (2000) emphasizes that, depending on the situation, the impoverishment processes cited above are just potential risks and not necessarily the actual ones. In his own words, Cernea (2000:19), "all forced displacements are prone to major socio-economic risks, but not fatally condemned to succumb to them". Indeed, the IRLR model proposes risk reversal, consisting several livelihood reconstruction components, as in, from landlessness to land-based re-establishment and from

joblessness to reemployment; from homelessness to house reconstruction; from social disarticulation to community reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, and from expropriation to restoration of community assets and services; and from food insecurity to adequate nutrition and from increased morbidity to better health care. This implies that a well-planned and implemented resettlement scheme can never lead to adverse effects on the resettlers, the host community, and the environment. Basically, resettlements end up in disarray because of lack of proper inputs in appropriate time and place.

This research used the IRLR model as a tool to analyze the post conflict resettlement of IDPs in Kenya. The policy message in this model is that displacement risks can be counteracted through a policy response, and that specific plans are necessary to mitigate displacement-related risks. Hence, there is a need for the participation of all actors including the displaced persons, government and non-governmental organizations to manage this problem. Pioneer research on displaced population in Kenya has concentrated on the challenges of IDP camps. To the best of our knowledge no research has been done to examine the strategies used by the government and some of the Nongovernmental organizations in resettling the IDPs. The paper analyses the gaps in the process and recommends the best practices for policy change, in the hope that the results shall initiate other researchers to apply critical analytical frameworks and indices to look into the resettlement of IDPs in Kenya.

Government and Non-governmental Actors in the Resettlement and Reintegration of IDPs

According to Hampton (2002) internal displacement poses perhaps one of the most daunting humanitarian challenges around the world. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement published in 1998 stress that the national authorities are responsible for establishing the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return, as well as providing the means to assist IDPs to voluntarily pursue durable solutions in safety and with dignity (Deng, 2012). However, many states regard the guiding principles as non-binding, and even as amounting to interference in a sovereign issue. Hence, more often than not, such authorities are unwilling or unable to fulfill these obligations, thus forcing large numbers of IDPs to flee several times due to exposure of more violence, malnutrition and diseases (Kellenberger, 2009).

Kellenberger (2009) argues that the magnitude of the problem of internal displacement is generally beyond the capacity of any single actor, as it requires the input of various actors like bilateral governmental donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in a systematically coordinated effort in order to enhance the use of their resources, capacities and competencies. Besides, due to their roles as implementing partners for

agencies like the United Nations, NGOs are currently the second greatest source of protection and relief. However the work of NGOs in displacement situations is hampered by their lack of formal mandates or charters to work with IDPs, and lack of coordination and cooperation from governments (Cohen & Deng 1998). Kellenberger (2009) adds that international and local actors who attempt to assist IDPs encounter challenges in providing coherent and systematic humanitarian aid to IDPs who return to their places of origin, or settle locally in the community that hosted them, or relocate to another place, more so when governments encourage IDPs return to ensure political stability even when security on the ground is not conducive for return.

This was the case in Sri Lanka after several decades of war between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Chandran (2012) observes that the resettlement of IDPs after the conflict in Sri Lanka posed a great challenge to the government as it was hard pressed to assure and convince the citizens that there would be no more threats of terror attacks and that the affected could actually go back and live normal lives. Chandran (2012) observes that during resettlement of IDPs governments are challenged to assure the displaced population on safety, good conditions before return and the recovery of property.

Kuhlman (2002) indicates that IDPs on the other hand face economic challenges occasioned by lack of housing, land and working tools. He wonders how people can rebuild their lives in circumstances where they have lost their homes, income and are suffering the trauma of violence. Chang' (2007) in a case study of the conflict in Sudan established that the quest for protection is a major stimulant for the rise of IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa. He points out that the Sudan government was for many years indifferent regarding the sharing of national resources with the then southern Sudan region leading to a rise of IDPs in the country. Chang' (2007) states that research had established that Sudan used the Janjaweed militia to terrorize the southern Sudan region in a bid to disperse populations away from the oil rich territories. For that matter, the government of Sudan was slow and reluctant to provide safety and security to the IDPs leading to humanitarian crisis of unimagined proportions.

A sudden change in government policy can also challenge IDPs. Yulia & Tabib (2011) studied the vulnerabilities and protection needs of IDPs in Arzarbaja and found that IDPs rely on government transfers for more than half of their income. The study established that the government of Arzarbaja failed to take into consideration that during many years of displacement some IDPs succeeded in integrating into mainstream society and had improved their lives. In fact, some Arzarbaja IDPs fared better than members of host communities or benefited more from lands belonging to others that they occupied (Yulia & Tabib, 2011). The study castigates the blanket approach towards IDPs adding that the policy failed to

efficiently utilize the limited state funds that were allocated for the purpose.

Other studies have intimated that it is not enough to settle IDPs when the means of their livelihoods and survival are not guaranteed (Macrae & Harmer, 2003; Reindrop, 2012; Goetze, 2010). Each of these studies proposes that the resettlement and integration process of IDPs should involve international and local NGOs. In particular, Goetze (2010) advances the view that the crafting of relief and development strategies should lay emphasis on the need of monitoring how humanitarian aid is used to meet their basic needs of displaced persons, to avoid the misuse of the same aid.

In Kenya studies on IDPs after the 2007/2008 conflict indicate that there was little humanitarian response to the violence (Kamungi and Klopp, 2008; and Kitale, 2011). In particular, the study by Kitale (2011) shows that the government response to the crisis was timid, and that of the humanitarian NGOs provided a temporary solution, for their response was remarkably short-lived probably owing to the position of Kenya in the Horn of Africa, a region that had major conflicts in countries of Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Like Waki (2008) and Kitale (2011), Klopp (2009) blames the government for inconsistency, and lack of IDP resettlement policy. She suggests that all actors must bridge the gap between short-term emergency funding and longer-term development assistance if they are to find durable solutions for IDPs.

In April 2008 the Kenya government released the National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy as a way forward to resettle the displaced persons. The government preferred a quick resettlement in order to promote development, improve the national image abroad, prevent IDP camps from becoming fertile grounds for militia and criminal gang recruitment, and to enhance human rights of the displaced (GOK, 2008). From the onset, the Office of the President preferred the return rather than relocation of IDPs, as relocation posed many challenges to the fragile peace (Mwiandi, 2008). Through the National Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement the government embarked on resettling and assisting the displaced persons by providing compensation for shelter and supporting livelihoods and reconciliation. This activity enabled a number of families to resettle and return to their farms, but the scheme was heavily criticized by a section of civil society and the media as having been grossly mismanaged. In the meantime hundreds of both local and international NGOs became active in the follow-up of the post-election violence to reduce the suffering of the IDPs.

But according to Mwiandi (2008) the government and other actors were confronted by the issue of some IDPs who refused to move out of the camp and resettle elsewhere citing meagre government assistance that only amounted to Ksh.10, 000/= (\$125). The IDPs also complained that they were not consulted about moving

back to their former residences with some of them comfortable with the arrangement. There was also the need for a lasting solution to the reintegrating of the IDPs, rather than providing makeshift security in the form of constructing many police posts (Mwiandi, 2008; Kamungi, 2009 & HPG, 2008). This paper discusses some of the strategies used by the government and some of the Nongovernmental organizations in resettling the IDPs. The gaps in the process are analysed and best practices recommended for policy change.

Methodology

The study employed the *ex post facto* comparative research design to draw comparisons between the experiences of the in camp and out of camp IDPs and how this influenced resettlement and reintegration amongst displaced persons in Uasin Gishu County. The region was selected for the study because it was among the worst hit by the 2007/2008 post-election violence and bore the largest numbers of displaced. The county was home to 34 IDP camps which hosted 7,249 households comprising 20,810 people. The camps were spread across the districts of Eldoret East, Eldoret West and Wareng (G.O.K. 2010). The county is cosmopolitan and is inhabited by the Kalenjin, Luo, Maasai, Abaluhya, Abagusii and Agikuyu, among other ethnic groups. The research was carried out on four IDP camps namely Yamumbi, Naka, Lorian and Rurigi. These camps were chosen because they still hosted IDPs who were unwilling to move out and resettle. The research also focused on Lorian, Yamumbi, Rurigi and Rukuini farms in Burnt Forest, as these are the areas where the IDPs could be traced after their movement from the camps.

The target population comprised the people displaced during the 2007/2008 post-election conflict living in Uasin Gishu County, the 60 humanitarian organizations involved in the resettlement process, and the state and its representatives. Using Cochran's (1977) table, the research drew a sample size of 378 out of a population of 7,249 IDP households. The study used the formula by Gay (1987) to purposively select 10% of the population comprising 2 CBOs, 1 church organization, and 3 international organizations, out of the 60 humanitarian organizations. The research interviewed one person from each organization, and representatives of the Ministry of Special Programmes, the District Commissioner, and District Officers.

The research utilized both primary and secondary data. Primary data was mainly collected using open and close ended questionnaires, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and observations about the strategies used by state and non-state actors to resettle the IDP population, the social and economic factors that influence reintegration, and the views and opinion of IDPs on whether to stay in camps or move out. Secondary data from published and

unpublished books, journals, research by humanitarian centers, maps, dissertations, policy documents and newspapers was collected from libraries, digital libraries, internet sources as well as governmental official records. The instruments and tools were tested for reliability. Analysis of data was done using a variety of descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive data was analyzed using SPSS. Qualitative data was categorized into themes based on the research objective.

Results

The main actors that managed the process of resettlement and reintegration of IDPs comprised the government agencies and local implementing partners, through funds from the international community. The government was responsible for defining a policy framework and enforcing important measures to facilitate the process. The resettlement operation was overseen by the Ministry of Special Programmes.

The Role of Organizations in the Resettlement and Reintegration Process

The state and non-state actors played different roles in the resettlement process. The Ministry of Special Programmes was tasked in providing land to the IDPs who feared to return to their original homes; providing houses to people who had their shelters destroyed during the conflict; coordinating all the humanitarian activities targeting IDPs; and coordinating peace building activities. In line with the government's National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy, the National Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement helped in resettling the IDPs by compensating for shelter and supporting livelihoods.

Up to June 2012 the government had through the Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy conceived 4 resettlement program to resettle and reintegrate the IDPs, namely: *Operation for Voluntary Return* of February 2008 which offered food rations only; *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* of May 2008 that provided two cash allowances of Ksh.10,000 and Ksh.25,000 respectively, food, tents among other provisions; and, *Operation Ujirani Mwema* (literally for good neighbourliness) and *Operation Tujenge Pamoja* (translated let's build together), implemented later on to promote reconciliation and reconstruct destroyed homes and infrastructure.

During these operations and support programmes the government employed a number of strategies including: profiling of IDPs, assisting IDPs to return to their homes and farms, giving Ksh.10, 000 to each IDP household, providing further Ksh.25, 000 for housing reconstruction,

giving food to IDPs until they harvested their crops, providing farm inputs, reconstructing of infrastructures such as schools, peace building and reconciliation, psychological counselling of IDPs, and providing relief aid. In total, the government said it had allocated Ksh.7.977 billion (approximately \$ 100 million) towards the resettlement of IDPs and was hoping to spend more than Ksh.9.8 billion (\$122.5 million) on IDPs by the end of the 2010/2011 financial year (KNCHR, 2011).

The Danish Refugee Council provided shelter and also engaged the Refugee Legal Aid Organization (R.C.K) to project and promotes the rights and welfare of IDPs and returnees. The components of the activities of the Danish Refugee Council included: providing legal aid programme to IDPs and would be asylum seekers; sensitizing refugees on their rights, obligations and on self-representation skills; psychosocial support in form of counselling; advocacy programme in the form of identifying and training paralegal and human rights monitors amongst IDPs and returnees; information and research programme in the form of captivating awareness among IDPs.

The IOM provided IDPs with shelter and livelihoods to promote and sustain peace and reconciliation in areas of return. The agency used a roadmap drawn from the practices of the 2008 Emergency and Early Recovery including logistics, projection and psychosocial. IOM also conducted community assessments or scans in the areas of intervention in order to better understand the structural issues behind violence, assist in identification of community structures, institutions and individuals which could become the anchors for peace building. IOM also established peace centers in each district that served as a physical manifestation of peace dividends as well as community halls for community gatherings. The work of IOM also benefitted the non-displaced and host families who were assessed as vulnerable, more so the communities that set good examples and had demonstrated a willingness to reconcile and co-exist in peace.

The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) was involved in lobbying and advocacy for resettlement and peace for the IDPs, psycho-social therapy for the most affected, and sensitizing individuals, communities on justice and peace. In doing so, the CJPC espoused the teachings of the gospel to eradicate injustice whenever it surfaced, encouraged and supported the CJPC diocesan and other groups involved in justice and peace issues, and co-operated with other institutions, churches, and people in the spirit of Christian unity. The CJPC major components included partnering with District Peace Committees and strengthening village committees through exchange programmes and visits for exposure and experience sharing. One beneficiary of this program had this to say:

Father told us to eat together and to love one another. We realized that we could love one another and so we loved one another (FGD, Lorian).

Through funding from CRS and Caritas Australia the church also formed inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace committees. This was clearly evident in an eight-kilometre connector Annan Road project that linked the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities of Yamumbi and Kapteldon respectively, with the aim of fostering free exchange, movement and communication. During the course of the project the people opted to use manual labour instead of machines so that they could work, eat and play together. CJPC also partnered with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – a body charged with conflict analysis and early warning systems, Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA) which was responsible for trauma healing, and PACT Kenya which focused on conflict transformation and resolution. Table 1 below summarizes the activities of the most prominent actors in the resettlement and reintegration process.

Table 1. Participating actors in the resettlement program

| Actors | Services offered |
|--|---|
| Catholic Relief services (CRS) / CJPC | Provided water, toilets, medication in camps, connector projects, peace process, gave livelihood vouchers of 15,000, Advocacy. |
| Red Cross | Provided food and cooking fat in camp, constructed two roomed houses. |
| International Organization for Migration (IOM) | Provided food in the camps, provided seeds and fertilizers, built two roomed houses, facilitated a group to undertake peace building project. Livelihood and shelter at Kesses. |
| Government- Ministry of Special Programmes | Gave food in camps, offered security and protection, Provided money and transport for resettlement-25,000, gave fertilizers, formed District peace committees (DPC). |
| Silk Innovations | Microfinance. Giving hope through savings and lending. Income generating training activities. |
| Concern Worldwide | Sending 4000 shillings via Mpesa to selected people per month |
| Danish Refugee Council | Advocacy. Built houses, provided water tanks. |
| Coalition for Peace In Africa | Trauma healing. |

Source: Field Data

How IDPs Benefited from the Activities of the Main Actors

A number of the organizations involved in the resettlement of IDPS strove to actively promote, protect and respect human rights and adhere to democratic principles at all levels of governance. They opened dialogue to address the root causes of conflict and paved way for reforms to resolve the conflict. They also strategized on how to create trauma awareness among returnees.

However, the strategies employed by the government did not achieve a complete resettlement and reintegration of IDPs. One government representative told this research that the plight of some integrated IDPs who never set foot in the camps was never properly addressed. Other IDPs were unable to move back to their pre-displacement homes despite receiving the government’s return package. The government was limited in terms of resources and did not have proper mechanisms to address the root causes of conflict to make proper resolutions, thereby making it impossible for partner organizations to cover all the affected persons. One respondent complained that:

The Catholic Church was giving people 15000 shillings for livelihood. Some of us were not given. We are still waiting (FGD, Yamumbi).

This research established that resettlement became a problem because the government faced the challenge of replication and duplication of IDPs. One chief in Yamumbi and another government representative expressed that it was a problem to identify the real victims from the fictitious ones. The two attributed this problem to poor leadership and corruption of some IDP leaders. Once out of the camps some IDPs still expected more handouts and were therefore reluctant to engage in income generating activities. Organizations that tried to economically empower the IDPs became frustrated because the IDPs were generally not keen on the idea. The government representative also stated that lack of political goodwill also affected the implementation of strategies. Local politicians played a key role in fuelling the conflict at the beginning, and were now frustrating reconciliation efforts. They fanned hate speeches and did not participate in the reconciliation efforts. The humanitarian organizations on the ground concurred with the government adding that bad politics was a source of frustrations in the resettlement process as politicians tried to manipulate the resettlement process for their own selfish gains.

The IOM worked closely with the Kenya government, the UN, Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), and other international and local partners to execute a coordinated response to the needs of the country at the peak of the crisis. It also partnered with other organizations like: Rehema Kenya Enterprise Development Organization (R.E.K.O.) to conduct a baseline survey in target areas for peace building activities; and Yamumbi Energy Savings (YES) Self Help Group for trauma healing, peace building and innovative economic empowerment. IOM also trained 20 facilitators for the government for a project in Wareng’s Kesses Division; assisted KRCS with the establishment of three significant IDP camps in the Rift Valley; provided logistic support for the movement of stranded IDPs throughout the country; teamed up with the Ministry of Health and KRCS to provide counselling outreach to thousands of IDPs in camps, which resulted in the safe relocation of 20,000 vulnerable IDPs to secure locations. The organization was

also active in facilitating voluntary movements of IDPs in various parts of the country during the *Operation Rudi Nyumbani*. It also supported the ‘Go and See’ visits, which were useful for identifying service gaps in areas of return, extent of damage and recommendations for intervention. An IOM representative expressed that these visits served to raise the confidence levels of IDPs especially those that had never set foot in their homes since the emergency began.

Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILK) was a project by the Catholic Church tasked to make the resettling IDPs self-reliant. SILK had the resettling IDPs organize themselves in self-help groups of 10-25 members. However, some IDPs resisted the plans because they did not want to contribute to any initiative, even after some of their lot had succeeded with SILK programs. A respondent in Burnt Forest was grateful for what silk had done. These were her comments:

Silk has empowered us to do many things like soap making, yoghurt and shampoo yet many people do not want

to join it. (F.W. Burnt Forest).

As stated earlier the Danish Refugee Council was charged with facilitating refugees’ access to legal and social justice. The Danish Refugee Council, through its information and research programme, developed strategic partnerships with research and academic institutions to raise awareness among IDPs through legal and advocacy interventions. The organization was able to enhance reintegration by having people from different ethnic backgrounds, gender and age come together to discuss the root causes of the conflict. However its success was only limited for it only trained a few people in the hope that they would replicate the same to larger groups.

That said, most respondents did not have a good evaluation of the programmes provided by most humanitarian actors, and they regarded the programmes as good on paper but lacking in commitment to help resettle and reintegrate the IDPs. The assessed of the respondents regarding the level of the actors are illustrated in table 2 below.

Table 2. Commitment to assisting the IDPs Out of camp

| | Committed | Somehow committed | Not committed | No response | Totals |
|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|
| Donors and NGOs | 81(42.9%) | 62(32.8%) | 45(23.8%) | 1(0.5%) | 189(100%) |
| Government | 76(40.2%) | 73(38.6%) | 39(20.6%) | 1(0.5%) | 189(100%) |
| Neighbours | 74(39.7%) | 66(34.9%) | 45(23.8%) | 3(1.6%) | 189(100%) |
| Friends | 68(36.0%) | 74(39.2%) | 43(22.8%) | 4(2.1%) | 189(100%) |
| Church | 42(22.2%) | 91(48.1%) | 54(28.1%) | 2(1.1%) | 189(100%) |
| Family | 36(19.1%) | 83(43.9%) | 67(35.4%) | 3(1.6%) | 189(100%) |
| General public | 17(9.0%) | 147(77.8%) | 20(10.6%) | 5(2.6%) | 189(100%) |
| In-camp | | | | | |
| Church | 92(48.0%) | 34(18.0%) | 42(22.2%) | 21(11.1%) | 189(100%) |
| Family | 91(48.1%) | 17(9.0%) | 62(32.8%) | 19(10.1%) | 189(100%) |
| Government | 81(42.9%) | 67(35.4%) | 15(7.9%) | 26(13.8%) | 189(100%) |
| Neighbours | 62(32.8%) | 47(24.9%) | 69(36.5%) | 11(5.8%) | 189(100%) |
| Friends | 63(33.4%) | 47(24.9%) | 69(35.4%) | 12(6.3%) | 189(100%) |
| Donors and NGOs | 42(22.2%) | 46(24.3%) | 58(30.7%) | 43(22.8%) | 189(100%) |
| General public | 17(9.0%) | 32(16.9%) | 75(39.7%) | 65(34.4%) | 189(100%) |

Source: Field Data.

From the results 42.9% respondents indicated that donors and NGOs were committed to assisting them, while 32.8% felt that somehow donors were committed, and 23.8% felt that donors and NGOs were not committed to assisting them. The in camp group rated the donors and NGOs poorly, with 22.0% stating that they were committed to helping them and 30% saying they were not committed to assisting them.

Secondly, 40.2% of the out of camp respondents indicated that the government was committed to assisting them, while 38.6% stated that the government was somehow committed in helping them, and 20.6% stated that the government was not committed to assisting them, compared to 42.9% of the in the camp respondents who stated that the government was committed to helping them, while 35.4% of them said it was somehow committed, and 7.9% of them said the government was not committed to helping them. The two groups blamed government for high corruption in distribution of relief food, failure to issue to all IDPs the promised Kshs. 25,000, and their not being accorded more than just houses to be resettled.

Further, some 56.6% out of camp respondents indicated that the government had honoured all its pledges, while 43.7% of them felt that it had not, compared to 42.3% of the in-camp respondents who indicated that the government had honoured all its pledges, with 57.7% of them indicating that it had not. Some 52.3% of the out of camp respondents who accused the government for reneging on its promises cited the government failure to provide financial assistance, while 47.7% blame it for failure to land farm implements, and to prosecute their nemesis as promised. The in the camp respondents blamed the government for reneging on land (66.6%), on financial assistance (28.0%), on farm implements (3.6%), and on justice through prosecution (1.8%). Some 62.5% of the in-camp respondents indicated that the assistance was not timely while 31.2% felt that the assistance was moderately timely, compared to 6.3% who felt it was quite timely.

Similarly, some 22.2% of the out of camp respondents felt that the church was committed to helping them, while 48.1% of them felt that the church was somehow committed, and 28.1% said the church was not committed to assisting them, compared to 48.0% of in-camp respondents who felt the church was committed, 19.0% who felt the church was somehow committed, and 32.8% who said the church were not committed to assisting them. Some 19.1% out of camp respondents felt the family was committed to helping them, 43.9% felt that it was somehow committed, and 35.4% felt that it was not committed to assisting them, compared to some 48.1% of the in camp respondents who said the family was committed to helping them, 19% was somehow committed, and 32.8% was not committed to helping them. Again 9.0% of the out of camp respondents felt that the general public was committed, 77.8% said that it was somehow committed, and 10.6% of them felt that it was not committed to helping them at all.

From these findings, it is clear that the out of camp

respondents felt that donors, NGOs, and the government were highest in commitment in assisting them, while those within the camp felt that the church was more committed to assisting them than other actors. The results reveal that a good number of returnees were satisfied with the government's efforts to resettle them. Those who thought otherwise lamented that they did not receive the Ksh. 25,000 as promised. The allocation of the money was riddled with controversies. Again some people got seeds for planting, while others did not. The IDPs were also dissatisfied with the timelines of the assistance they received from the government, donors, NGOs, and church in spite of the programs being relevant to a smooth and successful reintegration. Throughout, many nongovernmental actors worked hand in hand with the government, but most of the activities they undertook were unpredictable and were only initiated when funds became available. The manner in which strategies were designed also indicated a one-off assistance, and many of the projects wound up quickly before ensuring smooth transition of IDPs. Further, the NGO actors engaged in many activities without clear overall coordination. Many of these activities were helpful and meaningful to those who participated in them, but the overall efficacy of the programs in addressing the deep dynamics of violence and displacement remained questionable (Klopp *et al.*, 2010).

Humanitarian Actors Assistance to the Vulnerable Groups

Finally, this research inquired whether vulnerable groups got assistance from the humanitarian actors. Results indicated that 49.7% of out of camp respondents stated that women head of household (HOH) got assistance from humanitarian actors, compared to 21.2% who cited the elderly, while 18.3% who cited persons living with HIV/Aids (PLWHA), and 10.8% who cited children of 6 years and below. The in-camp respondents stated that humanitarian actors assisted elderly people of 60 years and above (39.0%), children of 6 years and below (28.7%), while 16.2% cited women HOH. From the foregoing it can be stated that most humanitarian actors had a preference on the category of people they sought to help; most humanitarian groups focused more on women HOH especially those out of camps. Inside the camps the humanitarian actors were more concerned with the elderly. The humanitarian actors were also focused in giving assistance to children below 6 years possibly to protect them against malnutrition and diseases.

The research also wanted to establish whether the humanitarian actors worked in consultation with IDPs. A good 77.8% of the out of camp respondents said they were sometimes consulted about their needs, 15.3% of them stated they were always consulted, while 2.6% of them were rarely consulted, and 4.2% were never consulted, compared to 39.7% of the in-camp respondents who were never consulted about their needs, 31.2% were sometimes

consulted, while 26.5% were rarely consulted, and 2.6% were always consulted. It is therefore obvious that the humanitarian actors did not consult majority of the in-camp respondents about their needs. This trend was the same in the bulk of the livelihood programs that the government implemented, which had a bias on agriculture yet a substantial number of the IDPs were not farmers. A disaggregation of the skills of the IDPs and their livelihood needs would have informed the government on the type of livelihood to offer. The government strategies failed to alleviate poverty as the programs concentrated on those who lost assets and personal possessions. Secondly, the aid was given at random without proper identification of IDP needs, priorities and beneficiaries; which was a pointer that the actors lacked systematically documented baseline information. Our findings agree with the research by Yulia & Tabib (2011) which established that treating IDPs uniformly ignores how they individually transform their lives during the many years of displacement, considering that some IDPs succeed in integrating into mainstream society. In sticking to this blanket approach the state failed to efficiently utilize the limited funds at hand. In the same manner, failure to consult the IDPs in spite of effectively responding to the situation on the ground made humanitarian actors not to address the needs of the displaced. These findings support Mwiandi (2008) who suggested that resettlement actors should consult IDPs before asking them to move back to their former areas of residence as many of them may not be comfortable with such arrangements.

Further, the research also sought to know whether the humanitarian actors had made any impact in fostering relationship between in camp IDPs and the host community. Some 45.5% of the out of camp respondents indicated that the humanitarian actors had made some impact on their relationship with the host community, 34.9% of them indicated that they had made very little impact, 18.0% of them indicated that they had made no impact, compared to 53.4% of the in-camp respondents who indicated that the humanitarian actors had made very little impact on the relationship, and 23.3% who indicated that they had made no impact. See table 3 below.

Table 3. The impact of actors on the relationship of IDPs and host community

| | In camp | | Out of camp | |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| A lot of impact | 86 | 45.5 | 36 | 19.0 |
| Very little impact | 66 | 34.9 | 101 | 53.4 |
| No impact | 34 | 18.0 | 44 | 23.3 |
| No response | 3 | 1.6 | 8 | 4.2 |
| Total | 120 | 100.0 | 136 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data

Second, on whether the humanitarian actors had made some contribution in reducing inter-group conflict, 51.9% of the out of camp respondents rated it as good, 2.1% of them rated it as excellent while 11.6% of them rated it as poor, compared to 64.6% of the in-camp respondents who rated it as good, and 27.0% rated it as poor, which means that both in the camp and out of camp IDPs appreciated the efforts made by humanitarian actors in reducing inter-group conflict (see table 4 below). This is contrary to assertion by UNOCHA Kenya (2010) that the humanitarian organizations left prematurely and did not take the IDPs through the transition stage, and did not provide support to these settlements after most IDP camps officially ceased to exist mid-2009.

Table 4. Contribution of humanitarian actors in reducing inter group conflict

| | In Camp | | Out of Camp | |
|--------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Excellent | 4 | 2.1 | 2 | 1.1 |
| Very good | 65 | 34.4 | 14 | 7.4 |
| Good | 98 | 51.9 | 122 | 64.6 |
| Poor | 22 | 11.6 | 51 | 27.0 |
| Total | 120 | 100.0 | 136 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data

In the end, this research found that the strategies used by the Catholic Church were greatly felt at the grassroots. In Kapteledon and Yamumbi, the IDPs were able to make return visits and members from different communities ate together as they reviewed the conflict and peace situations. On the contrary, a local peace worker informed this research that late government peace initiatives in the form of District Peace Committees formed failed to make any impact on the ground as they only relied on reports from local volunteer peace workers. Again, most of the activities of the District Peace Committees were largely focused on holding seminars with a few selected villagers and writing reports to show that the areas enjoyed relative calm. This is consistent with Klopp (2010) who established that peace-building organizations, with notable exceptions, continued to be urban and Nairobi-centric, focusing on sporadic small projects, youth exchanges, and workshops instead of building rural-urban coalitions to advocate for needed local structural changes, including building institutions around property restitution and other historical grievances.

Summary

The findings of this research indicate that there were various strategies that the government and nongovernment actors employed in facilitating the *Operation Return Home*.

However, the process suffered many gaps because the policies and structures the government put in place did not define how the process would be handled. For instance, the nongovernmental organizations were each handling different aspects of resettlement without proper coordination with the government and amongst themselves. Although they managed to resettle a significant number of IDPs and helped them to rebuild their lives, quite a number still felt the process could have been handled in a better way. Also the views of the IDPs on how best possible to manage their needs during the resettlement process were hardly sought. The IDPs had misconceptions on what the government was going to do for them. They felt that the government and nongovernmental organizations were not committed to reconciliation of the communities. They also believed that the resources meant for their assistance were not distributed efficiently. No effort was made to clear these misconceptions and many IDPs therefore remained in the camps.

Conclusions

The government and nongovernmental humanitarian actors used different strategies in approaching the resettlement of the out of camp IDPs and ensuring their reintegration into the communities. The government accomplished this feat after honoring its pledges to the IDPs and through support from the donor community. The humanitarian actors were in the overall able to take care of vulnerable groups. However, there was a gap between the strategies designed by the humanitarian organizations and their actual implementation. The psychosocial support to the displaced was not coordinated and some people who were traumatized did not receive help. Although the process was fraught with risks, and was limited in terms of resources, the state and the non-state actors made adjustments and moved on with the resettlement and reintegration of the IDPs. This vindicated the IRLR model that displacement risks can be counteracted through a policy response, and that specific plans are necessary to mitigate displacement-related risks. The study however observed that all the actors needed to all the times monitor the effectiveness of state programs that were meant to improve the livelihoods of the returnees in order to enact changes that would benefit the IDPs and local residents. All the non-state actors ought to have offered financial and technical support especially mainly on the resettlement and general development rather than support to the displaced in camps.

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